| William James is one of the most prominent | | | | consider that the distinction between truth and |
| philosophers of America of 19-20th cc. He made a | | | | verification cannot be associated with the deliberate |
| great contribution into the development of a | | | | neglect of realist epistemology because traditionally |
| philosophical thought of his time. He also widely uses | | | | he get used to be an epistemological realist. |
| his experience of psychologist in his works on | | | | Moreover, he made it clear that he understood well |
| philosophy. In his works he mainly speaks about | | | | and cordially supported the correspondence theory of |
| thinking and knowledge which he treats as | | | | truth. A bit later he told the following about the |
| instruments in the struggle to live that may be the | | | | truth-building and reality: "The pragmatist calls |
| result of his psychological practice. Also one of the | | | | satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but I |
| most important themes of his works is pragmatism. | | | | have everywhere called them insufficient unless |
| He generalized the pragmatism of Charles Sanders | | | | reality also be incidentally led to. If the reality |
| Peirce by asserting that the meaning of any idea | | | | assumed were cancelled from the pragmatist's |
| must be analyzed in terms of the succession of | | | | universe of discourse, he would straightway give the |
| experiential consequences it leads to the idea that | | | | name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining in spite |
| truth and error depend solely on these consequences. | | | | of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, |
| He applied pragmatism to the analysis of change and | | | | there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true |
| chance, freedom, variety, pluralism, and novelty. | | | | about... I remain an epistemological realist... Realities |
| Pragmatism was also the basis for his polemic against | | | | are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them." |
| monism, the "block universe," the idealistic doctrine of | | | | But at the same time a few years earlier William |
| internal relations, and all views that presented reality | | | | James told about the power of facts and the |
| as a static whole. He was also a leader of the | | | | difference between verification and truth in his |
| psychological movement of functionalism. | | | | saying: "Truth supposes a standard outside of the |
| But I think that the most interesting part of his work | | | | thinker to which he must conform." |
| is his views on free will and the role of chance in our | | | | His pragmatic theory of truth explains us why he is |
| life. In his famous essay "The Dilemma of | | | | so insistent on the necessity of existence of free |
| Determinism" James rejects determinism on the | | | | choices and freedom for people and I think that it is |
| ground that people do not have any free choices in | | | | the most probable explanation of his eagerness in |
| the life. So James appeal to direct experience to | | | | freedom because for him the quest of truth is of |
| provide evidence of existence of free choice. He | | | | paramount importance and here he says that people |
| estimates that feeling that all of us have such as | | | | have a definite choice or it's better to say they have |
| regret or sorrow do not make any sense unless | | | | two ways: either we must know the truth or we |
| there is some free will. And James believes that | | | | must avoid errors. Judging by his works it is not |
| people experience regret or sorrow only because | | | | difficult to guess that to know the truth is of primary |
| they could have done otherwise. He thinks that if | | | | importance for him and he thinks that normally people |
| determinism were true, then people could never have | | | | should chose this rather than the possibility to avoid |
| done otherwise and, consequently, he comes to the | | | | errors. |
| conclusion that they wouldn't have any reason to feel | | | | On reflecting about the factors which influence our |
| this regret or sorrow. | | | | opinion or which even form it he comes to the idea |
| In the work "The Dilemma of Determinism" William | | | | that there are some options between our opinions |
| James says the following about determinism: "What | | | | and depending on different circumstances they may |
| does determinism profess? It professes that those | | | | be either inevitable or they may be determined by |
| parts of the universe already laid down absolutely | | | | our choice. That is, not only do our emotions affect |
| appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. | | | | our thoughts but also there are some options to our |
| The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its | | | | opinions where this emotional influence is to be seen |
| womb... the whole is in each and every part, and | | | | as unavoidable and a determining factor in our |
| welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron | | | | choices. If one has any doubts as to this idea the |
| block, in which there can be no equivocation or | | | | only thing he needs is just recollect the facts that |
| shadow of turning." So from these words we may | | | | have been already mentioned in my work. I speak |
| judge about his views on the role of chance. This | | | | about two factors of our human nature which |
| quotation makes obvious the fact that we and | | | | influence our opinions they are the intension to avoid |
| everything around us are predetermined, fated. | | | | errors and the quest to find the truth. The ability to |
| Consequently, people do not have any independent | | | | sacrifice one for the other is normal - since the |
| choice in their life. Then the philosopher says that: | | | | option between acquiring and losing the truth is not |
| "The only deterministic escape from pessimism is | | | | temporary. This is the kind of thing that happens |
| everywhere to abandon the judgment of regret... But | | | | daily in science and in human everyday life in general. |
| does not this immediately bring us into a curious | | | | For, as James points out, the necessity to act is |
| logical predicament? Our determinism leads us to call | | | | seldom so urgent that even a controversial or |
| our judgments of regret wrong, because they are | | | | doubtful choice to act on is better than no choice at |
| pessimistic in implying that what is impossible yet | | | | all. Here decisions are made for practical reasons |
| ought to be. But how then about the judgments of | | | | allowing one to get onto the next order of business. |
| regret themselves? If they are wrong, other | | | | In the situations in which a hypothesis is trivial and |
| judgments, judgments of approval presumably, ought | | | | hardly ever living, the choice between believing a |
| to be in their place. But as they are necessitated, | | | | truth rather than a false is seldom forced. So again |
| nothing else can be in their place; and the universe is | | | | we see that the necessity of existence of fee |
| just what is was before,- namely, a place in which | | | | choices is of paramount importance for people and |
| what ought to be appears impossible. We have got | | | | they could really help them to avoid mistakes which |
| one foot out of the pessimistic bog, but the other | | | | are not ‘well accepted' by William James. |
| one sinks all the deeper. We have rescued our | | | | Thus, we can see that as I have already said the |
| actions from the bonds of evil, but our judgments | | | | existence of free choices is highly important for |
| are now held fast. When murders and treacheries | | | | James despite the fact that the fate, the chance is |
| cease to be sins, regrets are theoretic absurdities | | | | one of the most influential factors in human's life. But |
| and errors. The theoretic and the active life thus play | | | | anyway even nowadays we cannot help from |
| a kind of see-saw with each other on the ground of | | | | admiring the great work of the great philosopher. |
| evil. The rise of either sends the other down. Murder | | | | At the end of my work I want to recite the words |
| and treachery cannot be good without regret being | | | | of this man which to my mind express one of the |
| bad: regret cannot be good without treachery and | | | | principal idea of his essay "The Dilemma of |
| murder being bad. Both, however, are supposed to | | | | Determinism" and may be of his philosophy as well: |
| have been foredoomed; so something must be | | | | "Our determinism leads us to call our judgments of |
| fatally unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world." | | | | regret wrong, because they are pessimistic in implying |
| It means that the author wants to underline that in | | | | that what is impossible yet ought to be. But how |
| empiricism and pluralism he saw the only possible way | | | | then about the judgments of regret themselves? If |
| out from our confinement in fatalistic universe that | | | | they are wrong, other judgments, judgments of |
| seems to be absurd. | | | | approval presumably, ought to be in their place. But |
| Thus, William James defines truth as verification and | | | | as they are necessitated, nothing else can be in their |
| in such a way he rejects the idea that any | | | | place; and the universe is just what it was before - |
| unverifiable theory or idea, such as determinism, for | | | | namely, a place in which what ought to be appears |
| example, can be true. Despite the fact that he gives | | | | impossible. |
| such a pragmatic definition of truth we shouldn't | | | | |