| YURI KRAYTSBERG vs. YEVGENYA KRAYTSBERG | | | | G. L. c. 211, § 3, because "another remedy was |
| Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court | | | | expressly provided. The petitioner also purports to |
| Department and Newton Division of the District Court | | | | seek review of the District Court's original issuance of |
| Department. | | | | the c. 209A order in September, 1993, before the |
| SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS | | | | decision in Zullo, supra. Even assuming that the |
| July 6, 1998 | | | | petitioner properly sought relief under G. L. c. 211, § |
| Facts: | | | | 3, he failed to present evidence from which the single |
| On December 3, 1997, the petitioner filed a petition | | | | justice could have awarded him the relief he sought. |
| under G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking a single justice of this | | | | There was no basis on which the single justice could |
| court to vacate two restraining orders. A judge in | | | | have concluded that the original c. 209A order was |
| the Middlesex Probate and Family Court issued the | | | | procedurally defective. Therefore the single justice |
| first restraining order on February 16, 1993, under G. | | | | did not abuse his discretion or make a clear error of |
| L. c. 208, § 34B, pursuant to the court's jurisdiction | | | | law in denying the petitioner relief. |
| over the divorce between the petitioner and his wife, | | | | As for the restraining order under G. L. c. 208, § |
| one of the respondents in this case. A District Court | | | | 34B, the petitioner could have sought relief from that |
| judge issued the second order against the petitioner | | | | order in the Appeals Court at the time of its |
| on September 10, 1993, pursuant to G. L. c. 209A; | | | | issuance. Therefore, G. L. c. 211, § 3, was not a |
| the District Court judge has renewed the order | | | | proper avenue for relief from that order. The |
| every year since, most recently on September 11, | | | | petitioner implies that the Probate Court took no |
| 1997. The single justice denied the petition, and the | | | | action on a motion he filed in August, 1997, seeking |
| ex-husband appealed the order. | | | | to vacate the c. 208, § 34B, restraining order. |
| Issue: | | | | Therefore, he claims, he had no remedy other than |
| - Whether the Single justice erred in denying the | | | | to petition this court under c. 211, § 3. The record |
| petitioner relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3? | | | | merely indicates that the Probate Court continued a |
| Discussion: | | | | hearing on the motion to vacate, at the request of |
| This court will not reverse a single justice's denial of a | | | | respondent's counsel, because of a scheduling conflict. |
| petition brought pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, unless | | | | Even if the court had failed to act on the motion, as |
| the single justice abused his or her discretion or made | | | | the petitioner claims, there were other remedies |
| a clear error of law. The single justice neither | | | | available before seeking relief under c. 211, § 3. |
| abused his discretion nor made a clear error of law in | | | | The order of the single justice denying the petition |
| the instant case. The litigants seeking judicial review | | | | for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is hereby affirmed. |
| of an order made pursuant to G. L. c. 209A are | | | | Disclaimer: |
| directed to the Appeals Court. Therefore, in | | | | These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law |
| challenging the September, 1997, renewal of the c. | | | | Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of |
| 209A order, the petitioner could not avail himself of | | | | the Justices' opinions. |